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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Douglas Malar asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The
district court denied Mr. Malar’s motion to suppress evidence after an officer spoke to Mr. Malar
while he was parked at a gas station. During the encounter, the officer observed that Mr. Malar
slurred his words and admitted to drinking “too much.” The district court denied the motion to
suppress evidence, finding that the encounter was consensual and, during the encounter, the
officer developed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Malar had driven while intoxicated.
Mindful of the district court’s factual findings, Mr. Malar contends that the district court erred.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 1, 2018, Officer Alexander Mauri observed a vehicle being driven by
Douglas Malar stopped at a gas station. (Tr., p.4, L.19 – p.5, L.8.) (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.) The vehicle was stopped there for several minutes before it then
left the gas station and drove to a different gas station a few blocks away. (Tr., p.5, Ls.2-6.)
Officer Mauri followed the vehicle, parked some distance away and then walked up to Mr. Malar
and asked him if he minded speaking to him. (Tr., p.5, Ls.5-12; p.6, Ls.21-22; p.19, Ls.5-7.)
Officer Mauri asked Mr. Malar why he moved to a different gas station. (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-12; p.20,
Ls.13-17.) Mr. Malar answered to Officer Mauri’s satisfaction, but Officer Mauri smelled the
odor of alcohol on Mr. Malar and believed him to be slurring his words. (Tr., p.6, Ls.19-25;
p.20, Ls.1-6.)

Officer Mauri asked Mr. Malar to participate in field sobriety tests, which

Mr. Malar did not pass. (Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.9, L.24.) Officer Mauri arrested Mr. Malar for DUI.
1

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
1

(Tr., p.9, Ls.23-24.) Mr. Malar’s breath alcohol content was tested and the results were 0.20 and
0.202. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-6.)

Mr. Malar had previously been convicted of felony DUI in 2012.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.14-19.) Based on these facts, Mr. Malar was charged by Information with felony
DUI and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.66-68.)
Thereafter, Mr. Malar moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the officers lacked
any reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Mr. Malar. (R., pp.96-98.) The district court held a
hearing on the motion to suppress. (See generally, 2/8/19 Tr.)
The district court made the following written factual findings:
1. On November 1, 2018, at around 9:40 p.m., Officer Alexander Mauri was on
patrol in Kootenai County, Idaho. He saw Defendant’s maroon Honda SUV
sitting at a gas station at 21st Street and Sherman Avenue. The car idled for
about fifteen minutes. Defendant then left the gas station and drove toward
another gas station a few blocks away.
2. Officer Mauri contacted Officer Skay to advise the officer of his location.
Officer Mauri found Defendant’s behavior “odd,” and decided to approach
Defendant to find out why he moved the car to another gas station.
3. Officer Mauri followed Defendant to the new gas station, parked his patrol
vehicle approximately 25 feet behind Defendant’s vehicle and approached
Defendant’s vehicle on foot. While following Defendant’s vehicle, Officer
Mauri had not observed any traffic violations or suspicious behavior on the
part of the Defendant.
4. Defendant parked next to the gas pump and exited the vehicle. As Officer
Mauri approached Defendant, the Defendant started to walk toward Officer
Mauri. Officer Mauri came to within two to four feet of Defendant. Officer
Mauri then asked Defendant whether Defendant minded speaking with him. 2
When Defendant spoke, Officer Mauri noticed the odor of alcohol coming
from Defendant and that Defendant’s speech was slurred.
5. Officer Mauri asked Defendant why he drove from one gas station to another,
and Defendant’s answer dispelled any “weird suspicions” Officer Mauri may
2

Officer Mauri testified that he could not remember the exact wording of his question, but that
he always makes a point during consensual encounters to “say the same thing so it makes court
testimony easier.” The initial part of their encounter was not captured on Officer Mauri’s body
camera. See Defendant’s Ex. A.
2

have had. Officer Mauri then asked Defendant if he had been drinking based
on the odor of alcohol and Defendant’s slurred speech.
6. Defendant answered that he drank “a little too much,” and later admitted that
he drank three 16-ounce beers that evening. Defendant drank the last beer
within forty-five minutes of his arrival at the second gas station. Defendant’s
Ex. A.
7. Officer Mauri conducted field sobriety tests with the Defendant and arrested
Defendant for Driving Under the Influence based on the results of the field
sobriety tests. Id. Officer Mauri also administered two breath tests to
Defendant after Defendant’s arrest. Id.
8. At some point during the encounter, two other police vehicles arrived on
scene, including a field training officer, making a total of five officers at the
scene. However, only Officer Mauri was involved in questioning the
Defendant. Officer Mauri testified that the other officers arrived after
Defendant was detained. One officer who may have been Officer Skay spoke
with Defendant’s wife in Defendant’s vehicle while Officer Mauri spoke with
Defendant.
(R., pp.114-115.)3 The district court denied Mr. Malar’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.113-119.)
The district court concluded that Officer Mauri’s initial contact with Mr. Malar was consensual.
(R., p.116.) The court found that Officer Mauri developed reasonable, articulable suspicion to
detain Mr. Malar, pursuant to State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605 (Ct. App. 1993). (R., pp.116119.)
Mr. Malar entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of
his motion to suppress. (R., pp.143-144.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to
recommend a retained jurisdiction. (R., p.144.) The district court sentenced Mr. Malar to a
unified term of ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.145-149.)
Mr. Malar filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment - Retained
Jurisdiction. (R, pp.150-153, 159-163.)

3

The district court provided these findings of fact in several paragraphs. These findings have
been presented as individually numbered herein for ease of reading.
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Malar’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Malar’s Motion To Suppress Where The
Encounter Was Non-Consensual And Officer Mauri Did Not Have Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion That Mr. Malar Was Violating Idaho Law

A.

Introduction
Mr. Malar moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized because the initial

encounter between Mr. Malar and Officer Mauri was not consensual. Mr. Malar also asserted
that Officer Mauri stopped him absent reasonable articulable suspicion that he was violating the
law. Mindful of the district court’s factual findings, Mr. Malar asserts that the district court erred
by concluding that the encounter was consensual and by concluding that the officer had
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct.

This Court should reverse the order

denying Mr. Malar’s motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
This Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

5

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Malar’s Motion To Suppress Where The
Encounter Was Non-Consensual And Officer Mauri Did Not Have Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion That Mr. Malar Was Violating Idaho Law
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within “one of
several narrowly drawn exceptions.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012). The State
bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472 (Ct. App. 2002).
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory
detentions of a person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests. State v. Gutierrez, 137
Idaho 647, 65 (2002); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 346 (Ct. App. 1991). Although an arrest of
an individual must be based on probable cause, police may seize a person through an
investigatory stop without probable cause, provided there is a reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Knapp, 120 Idaho at 346-47; State v.
Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 220 (1984). An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon
specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about
to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003). The
purpose of a traffic stop is not permanently fixed at the moment the stop is initiated, however, for
during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that
which initially prompted the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000).

6

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). The State bears the burden of proving that
an investigatory stop or detention is based on reasonable suspicion and is limited in its scope and
duration to the issue being investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). “In order
to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person to be
seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.”

State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615

(Ct. App. 1997).
In Royer, (plurality opinion), the United States Supreme Court held:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him
if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person
is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his
voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies
himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however,
need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal
to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S., at 497-98 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
A seizure occurs when officers detain someone through physical force or show of
authority. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). “A seizure initiated through a show of
authority requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a
reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her
movement.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486 (2009) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499

7

U.S. 621 (1991)). A seizure occurs “when an officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011).
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.
Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). So long as law
enforcement “does not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required, the
encounter is deemed consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” State v. Randle, 152
Idaho 860, 862 (Ct. App. 2012). “The critical question is whether, taking into account all of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
or her business.” State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000). However, an
individual is not seized unless the individual actually submits to the officer’s show of
authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-29; Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486.

Therefore, in

determining whether an individual was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the
reviewing court examines:

(1) whether the officer’s show of authority was such that a

reasonable person would not feel free to leave; and (2) whether the individual submitted to that
show of authority. See Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486.
Idaho appellate courts have concluded that an individual in a parked car can be seized
either by physical force or a show of authority to which the individual submits. For example, the
Court of Appeals held a seizure occurred when an officer knocked on the driver’s side window
of the defendant’s vehicle and, after the defendant rolled his window down, asked what he was
doing and for his driver’s license. State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 (Ct. App. 1991). The Court

8

of Appeals found it significant that another officer was directly behind the defendant’s vehicle,
so the defendant could not drive away without running over the officer. Id. Along the same
lines, in State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals held the
defendant was seized when an officer commanded the defendant that “he needed to come speak
to me.” 143 Idaho at 905, 908. In Cardenas, two officers went to a house looking for a juvenile
runaway. Id. at 905. The officers saw the defendant sitting in a parked car in the driveway. Id.
As an officer approached, the defendant exited the car and walked towards the house. Id. The
Court of Appeals determined the officer’s “inherently coercive” language to speak with him
rendered the contact non-consensual and thus a seizure. Id. at 908.
In Willoughby, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant’s actions of remaining at
the scene and stepping from the car as the officer approached constituted submission to the
officers’ show of authority. 147 Idaho at 488. In reaching this holding, the Willoughby Court
analyzed the holdings of state courts in other jurisdictions to determine whether passive
acquiescence to an ambiguous show of authority constitutes submission such that a seizure
occurred. 147 Idaho at 488-89. The Court concluded that inaction is a form of compliance and a
submission to authority. Id., 147 Idaho at 489.
“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007). “There are two possible justifications for a traffic stop—the officer has
reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or the
officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, such as driving under the influence.”
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442 (2015). “When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the
grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the
burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at

9

811. In addition, even brief detentions of individuals must meet the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonableness. Id. This means that the detention must be both justified at its
inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that originally justified the
interference in the first place. Id.
In this case, the district court concluded that Officer Mauri’s initial contact with
Mr. Malar was a consensual encounter.

(R., p.116.)

Officer Mauri testified that as he

approached Mr. Malar, Mr. Malar walked towards him. (R., p.117.) The court found, “Officer
Mauri did not park his patrol vehicle in a way that would block Defendant’s exit, and he
approached Defendant’s location on foot.” (R., p.117.) The district court found no evidence that
Officer Mauri made a “display of authority” to Mr. Malar such that a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to ignore the officer and go about his business.4 (R., p.117.)
The district court concluded that “the odor of alcohol, Defendant’s slurred speech, and his
admission that he had ‘a little too much’ to drink provided reasonable articulable suspicion for
Officer Mauri to detain him.” (R., p.113.)

Mindful of the district court’s factual findings, the

encounter between Officer Mauri and Mr. Malar was not consensual and Officer Mauri did not
have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing such that his encounter with
Mr. Malar was lawful.
The district court erred in denying Mr. Malar’s motion to suppress evidence where the
encounter was not consensual and Officer Mauri did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Mr. Malar was driving his vehicle contrary to Idaho law. The discovery of the evidence
used against Mr. Malar was the product of his unlawful seizure and should have been suppressed
4

The district court’s finding of consensual contact was made despite the absence of evidence of
what the officer initially said to Mr. Malar, or how he said it—the district court found that the
officer testified that he did not recall the specific words he spoke to Mr. Malar and there is no
audio of the first, critical, portion of their encounter. (R., p.114; Defendant’s Ex. A.)
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as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).
Therefore, Mr. Malar asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Malar respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 21st day of January, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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